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China’s Grain Production
A Decade of Consecutive Growth or Stagnation?
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Some progressive writers have argued that while China’s agricultural 
privatization achieved short-term gains, it did so by undermining long-
term production facilities such as the infrastructure and public services 
built in the socialist era.1 Environmental scholars have questioned the 
sustainability of the Chinese agriculture. In a report published in 1995, 
Lester R. Brown raised the question: “Who will feed China?” He argued 
that the Chinese population’s changing diet, shrinking cropland, stag-
nating productivity, and environmental constraints would lead to a 
widening gap between China’s food supply and demand, a gap the 
world’s leading grain exporters would not be able to fill.2
China’s official statistics showed that the country’s grain production 
declined from 512 to 431 million tons between 1998 and 2003. However, 
according to the Chinese government, since 2004 it has achieved “ten 
years of consecutive growth” in grain production. According to the 
official statistics, China’s grain production reached 602 million tons in 
2013, nearly 40 percent above the 2003 level.
While the official statistics claim grain production has grown rap-
idly, China’s surging imports of cereals and soybean suggest that 
its grain production has struggled to catch up with demand. From 
2000 to 2012, China’s cereal imports rose from 3 to 14 million tons, 
and soybean imports rose from 13 to 59 million tons. In 2012, China’s 
cereal imports accounted for 5 percent of the world grain exports, 
and its soybean imports accounted for 61 percent of the world soy-
bean exports.3
This article argues that China’s actual grain production levels may 
be substantially lower than the officially reported levels; in fact, grain 
production has stagnated since the late 1990s. China’s growing depen-
dence on imports to meet its demand for grains will impose increasingly 
untenable pressure on the world grain market. In the long run, China’s 
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grain supply may be further undermined by constraints of land and 
water resources as well as environmental degradation.
In recent years, some Chinese agricultural experts have questioned 
the reliability of China’s official grain production statistics, and the 
second section discusses their opinions. The third section estimates 
China’s total uses of domestically produced grains; it is argued that the 
estimated total uses can be a good proxy of China’s grain production 
levels. China’s official statistics may have overestimated China’s actual 
grain production level in 2012 by about 100 million tons. The fourth 
section considers the long-term challenges to China’s food supply, and 
the last section comments on China’s privatized agricultural system.
did China Produce 600 Mil l ion tons of  grain?
According to the Chinese official statistics, China’s grain produc-
tion reached a record level of 602 million tons in 2013, marking the 
tenth year of consecutive growth starting from 2004.4
However, some Chinese agricultural experts have questioned the 
reliability of the official grain production statistics. In early 2012, when 
the Chinese ministry of agriculture announced that China had accom-
plished “the eighth year of consecutive growth” in grain production, a 
leading agricultural ecologist Jiang Gaoming argued that, for a variety 
of reasons, China’s official statistics were likely to have overestimated 
the true grain production levels.5
Jiang pointed out that China’s annual consumption of grains as food 
and feed was about 420 million tons. The official grain production level 
of 570 million tons in 2011 would imply a massive surplus of 150 million 
tons. However, there was no evidence of massive increase in grain stor-
age. On the contrary, China’s imports of cereals, soybean, and edible 
oil amounted to nearly 140 million tons of grain-equivalent in 2011.
In 2013, Li Changjin, a popular writer on China’s rural issues and 
a visiting scholar at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, conducted 
field research in one of the rice-growing counties in Jiangxi province.6 
According to Li’s research, since the early 1980s, the county’s arable 
land had declined by about a third and the county’s grain output had 
declined from 164 thousand tons in 1986 to 115 thousand tons in 2012. 
However, the county’s official statistical publication showed that the 
arable land had not decreased and the grain output stayed at 166 thou-
sand tons in 2012.
In the early 2000s, the Chinese government changed the agricultural 
subsidy policy. In 2004, the Chinese government started to implement 
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nationwide the “direct grain subsidy” (liangshi zhibu) policy. The policy 
intended to provide a cash subsidy directly to rural households, often 
in proportion to the reported sown areas. Li Changjin suspected that 
the “direct grain subsidy” policy might have given the rural local gov-
ernments incentives to over-report the sown areas.
Under China’s current agricultural statistical system, the national 
grain production statistics are inferred from a very small sample. The 
grain yields from the sample fields are used to project the nationwide 
yields using estimated sown areas.7 If the sown areas are over-reported 
and the grain yields in the sample fields do not represent most of the 
country well, the official statistics would involve large upside biases.
Li Changjin believed that the county where he conducted field 
research was representative of the rice-growing areas in the Southern 
provinces. His rough calculation suggested that China’s national grain 
production was likely to be around 500 million tons.8
China’s grain Production:  evidence from grain Uses
Theoretically, a country’s total grain production should always 
equal the country’s total uses of domestically produced grains. Most 
of the grain output is used for either direct food consumption or feed 
consumption. As a country’s population (like the Chinese population) 
shifts from plant-based diet towards a meat-based diet, the propor-
tion of grain output that is used for feed consumption would tend to 
increase. Other grain uses include industrial consumption (such as 
grains used for biofuels production), inventory change, net exports, 
and seed consumption and losses. 
Total grain production expressed in terms of use or consumption is 
thus as follows:
Total Uses of Domestically Produced Grains = Direct Food Consumption 
+ Feed Consumption + Industrial Consumption + Inventory Change + Net 
Exports + Seed Consumption and Losses
Some statistical discrepancies are inevitable between the reported 
grain production levels and the estimated total uses. However, the statis-
tical discrepancies should be reasonably small and distributed randomly 
across different years. One should not expect systematic divergence 
between the two series in either the positive or the negative direction. 
The following paragraphs explain how we estimate China’s grain uses.
Food and Feed Consumption.  China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics conducts household surveys in both the urban and the rural 
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areas. The survey data include per capita consumption of rice, edible 
oil, meat, and other food intakes. Other studies have established the 
transformation coefficients that transform meat, eggs, aqua-products, 
and dairy products into grain-equivalents in China. For example, 
according to Liang Shumin and Sun Qingzhen’s study, 1 kilogram of 
pork is equivalent to 4.6 kilograms of grains (see the sources of Table 
1). Combining these data, we estimate China’s total consumption of 
grains as food and feed. Table 1 shows how we estimate China’s grain 
consumption as food and feed in 2012.
Industrial Consumption. BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013 pro-
vides data of China’s ethanol production from 2001 to 2012. In 2012, 
China produced 1.7 million tons of ethanol.9 We assume that China’s 
grain input-ethanol output ratios were the same as those in the United 
States. Based on this assumption, China’s grain consumption for biofu-
els production in 2012 is estimated to be 7.2 million tons.
Inventory Change and net exports. The US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) publishes estimates of China’s grain stocks (including rice, 
table 1. China’s grain Consumption as Food and Feed, 2012
Per Capita Consumption (kg) Urban Rural
Transformation 
Coefficients
Grain (direct consumption) 78.8 164.3 1–1.1
Edible Oil 9.1 7.8 4.6–6.5
Pork 21.2 14.5 4.6
Beef and Mutton 3.7 1.9 3.65–4.6
Poultry 10.8 4.5 3.2
Eggs 10.5 5.9 3.6
Aqua-products 15.2 5.4 2
Dairy 14.0 5.0 0.2–1.2
Alcohol 6.9 10.0 0.72
Outside Dining (grain-equivalent) 117.6 1
Per Capita Grain Consumption (kg) 485 348
Population (millions) 712 642
Total Grain Consumption as Food/Feed (million tons) 345.3 223.4
Sources: Urban and rural consumption of various food items are from China Yearbook of Household Survey (Beijing: 
China Statistical Press, 2012). The transformation coefficients are from Liang Shumin and Sun Qingzhen, “The Mid- 
and Long-Term Forecast of China’s Food Consumption and Supply,” Zhongguo Shiwu yu Yingyang (China’s Food and 
Nutrition) 2: 37–401 (2006). The urban grain consumption through outside dining is estimated by assuming that 
grain consumption through outside dining is proportional to the monetary expenditures on outside dining.
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wheat, and coarse grains), which can be used to calculate the annual 
inventory changes (the difference between grain stock at the end of 
a year and the grain stock at the beginning of a year).10 Net exports 
are exports less imports. China’s grain exports and imports data are 
from China Statistical Yearbook, various years.11 Grain exports and imports 
include exports and imports of cereals, soybean, and edible oil.
seed Consumption and losses. Seed consumption uses grains as 
inputs in the subsequent production cycles. According to China’s 
Compilation of National Agricultural Cost-Revenue Statistics, seed consumption 
accounts for less than 2 percent of China’s annual grain output.12 There 
is no official data on grain losses. But Liao Yongsong, a researcher at 
the Rural Development Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, estimated that about 2 percent of China’s grain output was 
lost in storage, transportation, and processing.13 We assume that seed 
consumption and losses amount to 5 percent of China’s total uses of 
domestically produced grain.
total Uses of domestically Produced grains. Table 2 reports our 
estimates of China’s total uses of domestically produced grains for 
selected years. Chart 1 compares the estimated total uses with the offi-
cial grain production levels from 1981 to 2012.
From 1981 to 2007, the estimated total uses tracked closely the offi-
cial production levels. Whatever discrepancies that exist between the 
two series are small and appear to be randomly distributed. In twelve 
table 2. China’s total  Uses of  domestical ly Produced grains, 
selected years
Grain Uses (million tons) 1981 1990 2000 2010 2012
Food and Feed 327 420 500 553 569
Industrial 0 0 0 7 7
Inventory Change -8 15 -18 6 8
Net Exports -13 -14 -10 -103 -125
Seed and Losses 16 22 25 24 24
Total Uses 322 443 497 487 482
Official Grain Production 325 446 462 546 590
Discrepancy Ratio (%) 0.8% 0.7% -7.0% 12.1% 22.2%
Sources: See the sources of Table 1 and the text of the section on “China’s Grain Production: Evidence from Grain 
Uses.” The discrepancy ratio is defined as the ratio of the difference between the official grain production level and the 
estimated total uses over the estimated total uses. Positive or negative discrepancy ratios indicate official production 
levels being higher or lower than the estimated total uses.
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out of twenty-seven years, the official production level was higher than 
the estimated total uses. The largest “positive gap” happened in 2004, 
when the official production level was 8.7 percent higher than the esti-
mated grain uses. In the other fifteen years, the official production level 
was lower than the estimated total uses. The largest “negative gap” hap-
pened in 2003, when the official production level was 8.6 percent lower 
than the estimated grain uses. Over the entire period 1981–2007, the aver-
age discrepancy ratio was -1.3 percent. That is, on average, the official 
production levels were only 1.3 percent smaller than the estimated total 
uses. These results suggest that for the period 1981–2007, the estimated 
total uses were reasonably good proxies of official production levels.
However, since 2008, a significant and systematic gap has emerged 
between the two series. From 2008 to 2012, the official production level 
was consistently higher than the estimated total uses and the gap wid-
ened from 10.1 percent in 2008 to 22.2 percent in 2012. These systematic 
and widening gaps cannot be explained by normal statistical discrep-
ancies. Either there are large underestimating biases in the various 
sources we use to estimate China’s grain uses, or the official statistics 
have greatly overestimated China’s actual grain production levels.
Chart  1. China’s grain Production and total  Uses of 
domestical ly Produced grain, 1981–2012 (mil l ion of  tons)
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The estimated total uses are the sum of grain consumption as food and 
feed, industrial consumption, inventory change, net exports, seed con-
sumption, and losses. It is possible that the seed consumption and losses 
are higher than the assumed 5 percent of total grain uses. However, if this 
were the case, it would be difficult to explain why the estimated total uses 
matched the official production levels reasonably well from 1981 to 2007.
Grain exports and imports are based on China’s official statistics and 
can be verified by international trade statistics. Inventory changes and 
industrial consumption of grains are small and do not drive the overall 
trend. In 2012, inventory change and industrial consumption added up 
to 15 million tons, accounting for 2.5 percent of the official grain pro-
duction or 3.1 percent of the estimated total grain uses. By comparison, 
the discrepancy between the official grain production and the estimated 
total uses in 2012 was 108 million tons, which equaled 18.3 percent of the 
official grain production or 22.2 percent of the estimated total uses.
The grain consumption as food and feed is calculated using data from offi-
cial household surveys conducted by China’s National Bureau of Statistics. 
It is possible that the official surveys have underestimated the true grain 
consumption levels. However, the estimated total uses that were largely 
based on the estimated grain consumption as food and feed did match the 
official production levels well up to 2007. There is no particular reason to 
think that China’s official household surveys have become less accurate 
since 2007 and there is no obvious incentive for the National Bureau of 
Statistics to under-report the household grain consumption levels.
Our estimates show that China’s grain consumption as food and feed 
grew at an annual rate of 10.3 million tons from 1981 to 1990, 8.0 million 
tons from 1990 to 2000, and 5.7 million tons from 2000 to 2012. The slow-
down in grain consumption growth is consistent with the slowdown of 
China’s population growth and the generally accepted observation that 
as per capita income rises, the demand for food tends to rise more slowly.
In 2000, the estimated total uses were larger than the official grain 
production by about 7 percent. The inventory change, net exports, seed 
consumption, and losses were relatively small and offset each other. The 
discrepancies between the official grain production, the total uses, and the 
estimated grain consumption as food and feed were reasonably small (see 
Table 2). Thus, our estimate of the grain consumption as food and feed in 
2000 can be considered reasonably reliable. If one takes this estimate as 
the starting point, and assume that China’s grain consumption as food and 
feed grew from 2000 to 2012 at the same rate as it did in the 1990s, then 
China’s consumption in 2012 would be 597 million tons (rather than 569 
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million tons). This may be seen as the upper limit of the plausible range of 
grain consumption as food and feed in 2012. China’s total use of domesti-
cally produced grain in 2012 would be 510 million tons (rather than 482 
million tons). But even with this assumption, it would still leave 80 million 
tons (or 13.6 percent) of the official production unexplained. 
On the other hand, it would be interesting to note that the Chinese 
government started to implement the “direct grain subsidy” policy in 
2004. It is possible that three or four years after the implementation 
of the policy, many rural local governments began to realize that they 
could receive more subsidies by over-reporting sown areas or by not 
reporting lost sown areas (which might result from labor force migra-
tion, urbanization, or environmental degradation), they could maintain 
previous levels of subsidies.
The above analysis suggests that it is more likely that the Chinese official 
statistics have overestimated China’s actual grain production levels than 
that our estimated grain uses understate these levels. If the estimated total 
uses of domestically produced grains can be considered good proxies of 
China’s actual grain production levels, our estimates suggest that China’s 
actual grain production is currently about 100 million tons below the offi-
cial production level. While the official grain production had increased by 
about 90 million tons from 1998 to 2013, our estimates suggest that China’s 
actual grain production most likely has stagnated since the late 1990s.
Who Wil l  Feed China?
The rapid growth of modern agriculture has been based on mech-
anization, chemical inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides), 
irrigation, and high-yield seeds responsive to fertilizers and irrigation. 
Modern agriculture depends heavily on the nonrenewable fossil fuels 
for the production of chemical inputs, operation of farm machines, 
packaging, and transportation.
From an ecological perspective, modern agriculture is fundamen-
tally unsustainable. Mechanized tillage, use of chemical fertilizers, 
and large-scale monoculture lead to soil erosion. Pests develop generic 
resistance to pesticides. Perennial irrigation leads to waterlogging, 
salinization, and aquifer depletion. In the long run, all elements of 
modern agriculture suffer from diminishing returns.14
China’s agricultural growth in recent decades has been driven by 
large-scale application of modern agricultural inputs. Chart 2 shows 
the relationship between China’s grain yields and agricultural inputs 
for the period 1980–2012.
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From 1980 to 1996, China’s grain yields in average grew by 109 kilo-
grams per hectare a year, irrigated area as percent of the total agricultural 
sown area grew by 0.15 percent a year, fertilizer applications grew by 10.3 
kilograms per hectare a year, and agricultural machinery power grew by 
95 watts per hectare a year. An increase in grain yields by 100 kilograms 
was associated with an increase in irrigated area by 0.14 percent, an 
increase in fertilizer applications by 9.4 kilograms per hectare, and an 
increase in agricultural machinery by 87 watts per hectare.
From 1996 to 2012, China’s grain yields on average grew by 51 
kilograms per hectare a year, irrigated area as percent of the total agri-
cultural sown area grew by 0.34 percent a year, fertilizer applications 
grew by 6.6 kilograms per hectare a year, and agricultural machinery 
power grew by 234 watts per hectare. An increase in grain yields by 
100 kilograms was associated with an increase in irrigated area by 0.67 
percent, an increase in fertilizer applications by 13 kilograms per hect-
are, and an increase in agricultural machinery by 457 watts per hectare. 
Compared to the period 1980–1996, each of the three modern agricul-
tural technologies experienced substantial diminishing returns over 
the second sixteen-year period.
Chart 2 China’s Agricultural Inputs and Grain Yields, 1980–2012
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In 1996, China conducted the first nationwide land survey using 
satellite photography technology. The survey found that China’s total 
arable land was 130 million hectares in 1996. From 1996 to 2003, China 
lost 9.3 million hectares of arable land.15 Since then, the official statis-
tics show that China’s arable land has stabilized around 120 million 
hectares. However, much of China’s arable land has been degraded by 
soil erosion and industrial pollution.
According to research conducted by the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, about one-sixth of China’s arable land (or 20 million hectares) 
has been polluted by heavy metals. About 40 percent of China’s land is 
affected by soil erosion, salinization, and desertification.16 According 
to a paper published at the 19th World Congress of Soil Science, under 
the existing trend of soil erosion, China’s grain yields may decline by 
11 percent from 2005 to 2030 and by 15 percent from 2005 to 2050. As a 
result, China may face a food deficit of 14 percent of the expected food 
demand by 2030 and a food deficit of 18 percent by 2050.17
Worldwide, irrigated land accounts for less than 20 percent of the total 
cropland but contributes 40 percent of the total food production. On aver-
age, irrigated land is about three times as productive as rain-fed land.18 
China’s per capita water resources are only one-quarter of the world aver-
age. But almost 40 percent of China’s total sown area is irrigated. 
In 2012, China’s total water use by the agricultural sector was 388 
cubic kilometers, accounting for 63 percent of China’s total water use. 
Out of the 388 cubic kilometers, 113 cubic kilometers was withdrawn 
from the nonrenewable ground water.19 As the ground water becomes 
depleted, about 30 percent of China’s currently irrigated agriculture 
will be threatened. Given the land, water, and environmental con-
straints, China will have growing difficulty to raise domestic grain 
production. Indeed, according to our estimates, China’s grain produc-
tion has stagnated over the past one and a half decades.
From 2000 to 2012, China’s total imports of cereals and soybean rose 
from 16 to 72 million tons. China’s imports in 2012 accounted for 19 
percent of the world total exports of grains and soybean.20 From 2000 
to 2012, China’s imports of cereal and soybean grew at the rate of 4.7 
million tons a year. At this rate, China will need to import 157 million 
tons of cereals and soybean by 2030. This is the equivalent of 41 percent 
of the world grain and soybean exports in 2012 or the total grain pro-
duction of Brazil and Russia combined.
According to Carleton Schade and David Pimentel, due to the loss of 
arable and irrigated land, the world will struggle to meet the food demand 
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by the mid-twenty-first century. The world will fail to provide enough food 
for between 1 and 4 billion people by 2050.21 If the world grain and soy-
bean exports fail to increase significantly between now and 2030, China’s 
rising imports will impose unbearable pressure on the world grain market. 
Many small and poor countries will be priced out of the world grain mar-
ket. China may find itself unable to afford the surging food prices.
Whither Chinese agriculture?
There is widespread recognition that large-scale capitalist agri-
culture based on fossil fuels is fundamentally incompatible with 
environmental sustainability and cannot provide long-term solution to 
the world’s food problem. However, among some progressive scholars 
and activists, there is a tendency to romanticize petty peasant mode of 
production (small-scale agricultural production in which the peasant 
families own the land and other means of production) as an agricul-
tural system that is more equitable and sustainable than the capitalist 
mode of agricultural production.
In the early 1980s, China privatized agriculture and in effect restored 
the petty peasant economy in agriculture (with nominally commodity 
ownership). Since then, the world has observed what may have been 
the largest experiment of the petty peasant economy in modern time.22
Even today, the capitalist mode of production has made only limited 
intrusions into the Chinese agricultural sector. According to a recent 
survey by China’s Ministry of Agriculture, as of 2012, there were 877,000 
capitalist or quasi-capitalist “family farms” in China. The total arable 
land on which they operate was 12 million hectares, or 10 percent of the 
national total. Their average land-holding was 13 hectares, much larger 
than the average land-holding of a peasant family under the “Household 
Responsibility System,” which was only 0.5 hectare. The largest 16,500 
“family farms” each had a land-holding greater than 70 hectares.23
Because of the legacy of the Chinese Revolution, China’s petty 
peasant agriculture has developed under relatively “free” conditions, 
without oppression of feudalism or other pre-capitalist social relations, 
which continue to affect economic and social development in many 
Asian, African, and Latin American countries.
Despite such “ideal” conditions, the modern Chinese agriculture has 
produced essentially the same social and environmental consequences as 
the more typical capitalist agricultural systems. Since the 1980s, China’s 
rural areas have served as the main supplier of cheap labor force to the 
urban capitalist economy, undermining the bargaining power of the urban 
C h I n e s e  g r a I n  P r o d U C t I o n  35
working class. China’s inequality in income and wealth distribution has 
risen to levels comparable to other capitalist “middle-income” countries.
Like capitalist agriculture, Chinese agriculture of today relies heav-
ily on fossil fuels, synthetic chemical inputs, and, frequently, irrigation 
water polluted with industrial chemicals, resulting in land degradation 
and more water pollution. In many parts of rural China, pollution of 
soil, water, and crops has reached catastrophic levels. It is reported 
that there are about 250 “cancer villages” in China, where a dispropor-
tionally large fraction of the local population has died of cancer.24 
The Chinese experience over the past three decades has demon-
strated that the individual peasant households, even though they are 
“petty,” do not have a natural tendency to pursue socially and environ-
mentally sustainable objectives. Surrounded by the capitalist economic 
system, Chinese peasants are constantly induced as well as pressured 
by the logic of the capitalist market to pursue short-term private gains 
at the expense of the community and the environment.
The only “success” the privatized Chinese agriculture can claim is that 
it has achieved substantial increases in food production (partly by uti-
lizing the infrastructure built in the socialist era) and provided massive 
amounts of relatively cheap food (though occasionally poisonous) to the 
labor force employed by the urban capitalist sector.
However, if this article’s analysis proves to be valid, it would sug-
gest that the only “success” of the privatized Chinese agriculture is 
beginning to fall apart.
The challenge for China and the world is to develop a new agri-
cultural system that can manage the material exchanges between 
human society and nature in a sustainable way, can provide adequate 
and nutritional food to the entire population, and can distribute and 
deliver the food in accordance with social equity. It is difficult for us 
to imagine that these objectives can be accomplished by a social and 
economic system other than socialism.
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MONTHLY REVIEW F i f t y  Y e a r s  A g o
SPELLMAN: You often use the word revolution, is there a revolution 
underway in America today?
MALCOLM X: There hasn’t been. Revolution is like a forest fire. It burns 
everything in its path. The people who are involved in a revolution don’t become a 
part of the system—they destroy the system, they change the system. The genuine 
word for a revolution is Unwälzung which means a complete overturning and a 
complete change and the Negro Revolution is no revolution because it condemns 
the system and then asks the system that it has condemned to accept them into 
their system. That’s not a revolution—a revolution changes the system, it destroys 
the system and replaces it with a better one. It’s like a forest fire like I said—it 
burns everything in its path and the only way to stop a revolution is to ignite a fire 
that you control and use it against the fire that is burning out of control. What the 
white man in America has done, he realizes that there is a Black Revolution all over 
the world—a non-white revolution all over the world—and he sees it sweeping 
down upon America and in order to hold it back he ignited an artificial fire which 
he has named the Negro Revolt and he is using the Negro Revolt against the real 
Black Revolution that is going on all over this earth. 
—A.B. SpellmAn, “Interview with Malcolm X,” 
Monthly Review, May 1964
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